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ABSTRACT
Participation in political violence draws on identities and world views
that have been shaped and inﬂuenced by emotion. This article uses
data drawn from interviews conducted with 15 former members of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army to highlight some of the ways that
emotion is intertwined with decisions to use violence in pursuit of a
substate political goal. Six themes emerge that help to demonstrate
how participant’s emotional lives have helped to build the identities,
beliefs, and motivations that have led to violent acts. The study
illuminates how the experience, elicitation, and management of
emotions played an integral role in the participant’s trajectory towards
violence.
Drawing from a background in Cultural Criminology, Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward1
have argued that scholars of terrorism would beneﬁt from a deeper exploration of how vio-
lent nonstate political activists feel, not only how they think and act. This observation is a
jumping-off point for their broader argument that greater attention to the phenomenology
of violent political activity is needed to balance what they view as a disproportionate focus
on the organizational, ideological, and psychological processes of becoming involved. In a
similar call, Thomas Hegghammer has suggested that emotional processes are clearly impor-
tant when someone decides to join a violent clandestine group, noting that, “[t]he cultur-
alemotional dimension of jihadi activism remains largely unstudied and offers a promising
line of inquiry.”2 While it is important not to conﬂate different forms of nonstate political
violence, or to continue a fruitless search for a generic violent persona,3 human agency,
including violent political activism, is unrecognizable if devoid of any concept of emotion.
Emotion therefore needs to be examined alongside other possible drivers of violent political
behavior, particularly in relation to how they are related to wider social and political
contexts.4
Research into “what emotions are” is complex, contested, and controversial and there
remains no universal deﬁnition of emotion. Goldie points to the difﬁculty in reaching a collec-
tive consensus, suggesting that when we talk about an emotion we are discussing a “complex,
episodic, dynamic, and structured” set of perceptions, thoughts, and physiological experiences
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rather than an homogenous phenomenon.5 The approach taken here reﬂects two important
propositions about emotion. First, that emotion is intertwined with reason, rather than
diametrically opposed to it,6 and second, that emotions are a source of knowledge.7
The study of emotion tends to be seen as the domain of psychology. Within examinations
of substate political violence, psychological perspectives have brought, and will no doubt
continue to bring, crucial insights into how emotion contributes to the multitude of deci-
sions that eventually lead to engagement in substate political violence. For example, Speck-
hard8 draws attention to the way strong emotions emerging from pain and trauma can
contribute to the urge for vengeful violence. Similarly, Moghaddam’s9 stairway metaphor
emphasizes the emotional responses a person experiences as they proceed through a number
of stages that offer progressively fewer solutions to political grievances, until violence
emerges as the only conceivable option. Horgan10 points to the solidarity and emotional
bonds that arise in response to traumatic communal events such as Bloody Sunday, Matsu-
moto et al.11 focus on emotions expressed in the speeches of leaders, and Meloy and Yake-
ley12 ﬁnd that changes in the emotional life of lone wolves are a precursor to adopting a
violent ideology.
Within psychological and social psychological approaches to understanding terrorism,
attention is drawn to how emotions arise, at both an individual and a group level, in
response to different social and political experiences. Central to understanding why a person
may become involved in terrorism is understanding how, “the psychological and emotional
context of the individual” melds with the speciﬁc social context in a way that results in
violence.13
Scholars working from other disciplinary positions also recognize a place for emotions
and incorporate them into their analysis. Humiliation has ﬁgured signiﬁcantly in the work
of scholars such as Stern,14 Fattah and Fierke,15 and Gerges.16 In her work on German and
Italian left- and right-wing radicals operating during the 1960s and ‘70s, della Porta17 dem-
onstrated how the perceived abrogation of the state’s duties to its citizens led to the transfer
of affective bonds away from broader society and toward movements of protest and dissent.
In an approach informed by a background in both psychiatry and sociology, Sageman18
emphasizes the importance of “moral outrage” in the process of radicalization19 and in doing
so engages directly with questions about the kinds of emotions that may emerge in response
to perceived moral violations. He also questions the primacy that emotions such as humilia-
tion have been given in examinations of terrorist motivations.20
Despite the signiﬁcance of emotion to many analyses of nonstate political violence it is
surprising that the indexes of books on the subject are not ﬁlled with references to them.
Even with the importance of moral outrage to Sageman’s work, the terms “moral outrage,”
“emotion,” or “anger” do not appear in the index. That is not to say that the literature on ter-
rorism is not full of emotion. Emotions are ever-present in concepts such as revenge, blame,
outrage, collective identity, group solidarity, ideology, and violence, yet somehow the emo-
tional components become subsumed within traditional cognitivist accounts, thereby losing
some of the subjective and collective experience of emotion that may be signiﬁcant to under-
standing terrorism.21 Similarly, emotions tend to be treated as secondary phenomena arising
only in response to particular beliefs and evaluations about the world and the social relation-
ships that take place within it. From this understanding, moral outrage constitutes an emo-
tional response to a belief that unfair treatment has taken place. While this is no doubt
correct, it may also be incomplete as it is possible that emotion contributes to the
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development of belief as well as existing as a response to beliefs already formed.22 In this
sense, questions such as whether collective emotional experiences contribute to shared epis-
temological positions on which the adoption or rejection of particular ideologies rest seems
to be an important area of inquiry, as does whether judgments about ideologies are based
more on what “feels” authentic than on doctrinal content. Asking whether emotional experi-
ences, particularly those that are shared or experienced collectively, are used as evidence or
knowledge about the world, how it needs to be changed, and, crucially, how this should be
achieved would help strengthen the emotional component of terrorism research, as would
asking what the pleasurable aspects that come from engaging in political violence might
be.23 These are just some of the questions that are ripe for an interdisciplinary approach to
understanding violent political extremism and that also have consequences for building
effective counterterrorism strategies.
This article takes a step in this direction by using empirical data drawn from interviews
conducted with ﬁfteen former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to
highlight some of the ways that emotions have contributed to decisions to use violence in
pursuit of a substate political goal. It demonstrates how the emotions that arose in response
to persistent experiences of discrimination primed participants’ receptiveness to the idea of
physical force Republicanism, in part because of its ability to explain and validate the emo-
tions they were experiencing, and in part because these emotions formed the basis of strong
intuitive knowledge that added credibility to the ideology. The study also reveals how partic-
ipants interpreted their emotions as evidence of an overwhelming moral obligation to act, as
well as a resource to enable them to act violently. The study presented here contributes to a
growing interdisciplinary interest in how emotions are implicated in the stability or disrup-
tion of social, political, and cultural environments, including through the use of substate
political violence.
Methods
The data for this article are drawn from a larger research project that focused on the
role of emotion in shaping both the context and the individual mindset in which sub-
state political violence can be viewed as a legitimate political tactic. The objective was
to explore the emergence of subversive emotional dispositions and inﬂuences, including
any relationship they had to shaping morality, and in particular to what actions can be
perceived as legitimate or not. Data are drawn from research undertaken during a six-
week period in November and December of 2009 in the predominately Catholic, Lower
Falls area of West Belfast in Northern Ireland, although not all participants grew up or
were politically active in this area.
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews that allowed for a rich and detailed discussion of
life-histories formed the methodology adopted for this project. Participants were recruited
with the help of an umbrella organization for former Irish Republican political prisoners. An
ex-Republican prisoner and participant in the 1981 hunger strike initially acted as a “gate-
keeper,” asking several questions about the style and length of interviews, the sort of topics
to be discussed, the purpose of the research, and how it was funded.24 Ten interviews were
arranged through the gatekeeper and ﬁve were arranged through a snowball effect whereby
participants who had engaged in interviews introduced the researcher to other potential
participants.
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At the time of interviewing, participants ranged between the ages of 46 and 59 years old
and were all former PIRA members. The PIRA represents a splinter group of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) that emerged in response to tensions and divisions between the
Dublin leadership and the northern command of the IRA during the late 1960s. These ten-
sions led to a rupture of the IRA and the establishing of the dissident “Provos” committed to
achieving their goals via armed struggle.25 The PIRA operated as the primary violent Repub-
lican group during the period generally referred to as the Troubles.26 While there is no deﬁn-
itive agreement regarding precise dates of the Troubles, there is general agreement that this
refers to a period of violent instability often dated from October 1968 to late 1994.27
All participants were male. Although interviews with female participants were requested,
none volunteered. This may be a reﬂection of women actively refusing the stereotype of
“emotional,” which they may have worked hard to overcome in order to participate in the
PIRA. However, it may also reﬂect that they were a smaller pool to recruit from, or that they
simply had other priorities at this stage of their life beyond participating in research. All par-
ticipants had been imprisoned for acts of political violence with 13 participants serving time
at the Maze28 and two participants serving sentences outside of Northern Ireland.
Explanations of terrorism have periodically drawn on notions of a de-politicized actor
who is framed as “emotionally unbalanced” and therefore subject to psychologically abnor-
mal urges.29 It was possible that participants were aware of such traditions and would there-
fore be suspicious of any attempts to engage with a discussion of emotion in the belief that it
may be used to pathologize them. The researcher chose to spend the ﬁrst part of each inter-
view openly discussing the subject. The following exchange is indicative of those that took
place between the researcher and the participants:
Interviewer: Are you aware of some of the labels that have been used to describe you?
Ruari: Yeah, well there has always been that sort of thing, to discredit us I mean. […] Like, these
are mindless people who plant bombs and kill children and so all that, that was used, that was
very heavily used. […] They still use that.
Interviewer: The research I am doing is looking at emotions, but it is looking from the perspec-
tive of them being normal things, that everybody experiences, not from the perspective that
they are somehow totally irrational.
Ruari: Well, the opposite is said as well you know. That we’re cold and calculating, like killing
machines, no emotions at all. But, we are very normal people. I mean […] there are certain things
that affected me, that really made me sit back and try and kinda ﬁgure out why I was here. And
that was through things that I seen or heard or been involved with. I mean, we’re all human.30
It was this insistence on normality and the complexities of being human that set the tone
for the rest of the interviews. Further concerns surrounded how accurate the information
arising from the interviews could be. This included questions about how willing or able the
participant would be to face confronting, unpleasant emotional experiences, whether the
participant would be able to recall accurately the emotional experiences of the past, or
whether they might be disingenuous in relating them in order to further a private agenda.
These are all challenges that cannot easily be overcome or dismissed. Rather than focusing
on the idea of accessing some indelible and static “truth,” the approach taken here accepts
that how the participant chooses to relate their experiences, how they interpret them, what
they choose to tell and what they choose to exclude or avoid, all contribute important infor-
mation and insight into the participant and particularly into the meaning they place on their
experiences.
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Interviewing former members of the PIRA offered some advantages. In choosing a group of
people to participate in this study issues surrounding access to those who had personally engaged
in substate political violence, ability and willingness to speak about emotions, the researcher’s
personal safety, and unacknowledged agendas for participation were all considered. Ex-PIRA
members that participated in this study were in their late 40s to late 50s, have been disengaged
from direct violence since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, and were actively participating
in furthering the peace process and community cohesion. The substantial amount of time since
being imprisoned and disengaging from violence, along with personal maturity and a subsequent
commitment to pursuing political change through democratic processes, led to an ability and
willingness to reﬂect thoughtfully on the personal and social conditions that inﬂuenced their
choices to engage in violent political activism. While the PIRA participants had all been disen-
gaged from violence for a substantial amount of time Horgan31 warns against disregarding “past
participants as unfruitful sources for interviews,” suggesting this amounts to “a lack of apprecia-
tion of the true value of interview methodology,” which is not for the gathering of operational
information. Horgan,32 drawing on Crenshaw, points to the value of “primary data based on…
life histories”33 of those “who have long disengaged from their movements.” An unanticipated
beneﬁt from this cohort was that several had become parents and had children who were the age
they had been when they became politically active. This allowed for thoughtful and insightful
considerations about youthful behavior and for reﬂection on their own mindset at a similar age.
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. In each case, a pseudonym was created in
order to comply with University Ethics Committee requirements of anonymity. The data
were analyzed in a qualitative manner, drawing on a modiﬁed grounded theory methodol-
ogy.34 Interviews were thematically coded and extensive quotes that illustrated each theme
were collated and subsequently used to ground the analysis ﬁrmly within the data while
retaining the richness and depth of the original interviews. The analysis presented here has
inductively evolved from the data but the prompting questions that informed the interviews
are grounded within existing themes within the literature on terrorism.
Provos, Emotions, and Violence
When discussing how emotions ﬁgured in their decisions to join the Provos and engage in
violence, six themes emerged that help to illuminate how participant’s emotional lives have
helped to build identities, beliefs, and motivations that have led to violent acts. These themes
included the political nature of emotion, the connection between emotion and value judg-
ments, the physical experience of emotion, the sometimes misleading nature of emotions,
the connection between emotion, social groups, and social identity, and the importance of
emotion for mobilizing activity. While primarily exploratory, the interviews aimed at devel-
oping a deeper understanding of the various ways emotions are implicated in the develop-
ment of a mindset that justiﬁes violence in pursuit of a political goal. Emotions are often
conceptualized in limited terms, such as the provision of “heat” or “passion” for the cause,35
as individually situated deviations from normality that lead to irrational decision making, or
as representative of a form of pathology.36 The six themes expanded on below and illustrated
with excerpts from the interviews suggest a more complex understanding of the relationship
between violent political activism and emotions in which emotions are intertwined with rea-
son, operate as sources of knowledge, guide preferences and assessments of credibility, are a
resource to be strategically managed and performed, as well as providing energy to act.
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Emotions as Political
Recalling the different emotions considered signiﬁcant in their journey toward accepting
violence as a political tactic, participants often referred to their emotions as directed at, or
arising from, something. In other words, their emotions were responses to perceptions and
appraisals of their environment. As one former PIRA member explained,
… there was no equal status, you were second class citizens, and some people would say “no we
were third class citizen”… a lot of people felt they were not worthy to get jobs… you weren’t
good enough to match up … and that’s where the anger and the frustration came to the fore
because people then began to challenge it and say “this is no longer good enough.”37
For this PIRA member, his anger and frustration at being treated as a second- or third-
class citizen has developed in reference to his belief that Irish Catholics in Belfast were
unfairly treated in relation to their Protestant contemporaries. When asked why this was so
he explained,
… it’s just a matter of it’s inbuilt into the society… you notice […] that it’s harder for Catholics
to get a job and housing.…From the inception of the state […] you had the prime jobs in the
shipyards and the rope works and then later in the aircraft factories […] and practically ALL of
it was given over to the Unionist and Loyalist communities, and Nationalists were excluded
from that.38
This member’s emotional responses are not simply inexplicable internal afﬂictions, but
rather comprehensible reactions that have arisen in response to his subjective assessment of
his external social circumstances. If he had found himself in an environment in which he
perceived everyone to be in his own difﬁcult circumstances he may have responded more
with sadness. However, the fact that he has assessed his situation in relation to a privileged
or more powerful other has imbued his emotional responses with a sense of injustice. His
emotions help to both constitute and strengthen the conviction that his situation is funda-
mentally the result of a discriminatory social environment. This suggests that emotions sig-
nify changes in a person’s ability, or perceived ability, to think and act freely,39 giving them
an overtly political dimension. “Padraig” expressed an array of emotions that arose in refer-
ence to having his bag examined on the way to school:
… it’s an affront you know, an insult to be subjected to having your bag checked by a foreigner
in your own country, ya know, it’s meant to be humiliating, about making sure you know who
has the power. And it isn’t you, ya know. […] I mean, to just do it without resisting is like saying
that it’s ok to just stop school kids in the street and demand to know what’s in their bag. I mean,
you just resented it, so it’s natural to just resist a bit rather than make it too easy. You want to
send the message, you know, that it’s not ok and so showing some resistance is just part of life. I
think I would have felt ashamed to not resist in all these small ways, like deﬁance was part of
maintaining your pride. I mean, I was only about 14.40
The political nature of emotions provides a lens through which to examine the appeal of
violent political activism in which a person makes sense of their emotions in reference to
their own particular experiences of power and status.41 Certain emotional dispositions may
come to characterize groups of people who share a social identity or social position within
broader society because this position shapes their evaluation of the social world, effectively
connecting emotion to a variety of politicized identities.42 While these examples predate by
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several years the decision to join the PIRA, the experiences described worked to provide the
burgeoning political understandings that inform later decision making. As “Keiran” noted,
… it wasn’t Republicanism that mobilised me, it was about lashing out against the British
Army and the RUC. In time I came to understand that Republicanism provided answers,
historical evidence about why that was justiﬁed, but initially it was just an instinct
(emphasis added).43
Emotions Imply Value Judgments
Related to the political component visible in the experience of emotions, participants also
demonstrated a relationship between their emotions and value judgment. That is, their emo-
tions embodied a way of seeing the world, or a set of beliefs.44
We used to go to mass on Sunday morning in Clonard and my father took us around to see
Bombay Street and it was burned to the ground. So that was my ﬁrst introduction to the conﬂict
as such, and obviously you are trying to work things out in your own mind, but I remember
afterwards that I had a feeling of a sense of injustice that these people had been burned out of
their houses for no reason that I was aware of. I mean, these were people that I knew, some of
‘em, and they were good people, so in my mind there was no bigger picture that justiﬁed what
had happened, it was just wrong, ya know, ‘cause I knew all those people hadn’t done anything
wrong to deserve having all their houses burnt to the ground. And, so of course, when people
you know are attacked, for no reason you are aware of, you get angry because it isn’t just, it
shouldn’t happen.45
The experience of anger described here is connected to the value judgment of fairness.
This understanding presents a challenge to traditional ideas of emotion as a kind of “animal
impulse” that is totally disconnected from our reasoning, instead pointing to how the experi-
ence of emotion can alert us to a perceived moral violation, a point made effectively by Sage-
man,46 as well as implicit in the concept of “triggering events”47 that may push somebody
from being a passive supporter into an active participant in violence. In this sense, emotional
responses are understandable experiences arising from our beliefs and reasoning.48 More
recently emotion theory has also pointed to the way that judgments and appraisals are not
only the cause of emotion, but sometimes the outcome of them. In other words, emotion has
a role in establishing beliefs and inﬂuencing the way we think.49
Some members of the PIRA considered themselves epistemologically privileged in
their view of Northern Ireland because they saw their experience of suffering as provid-
ing knowledge that others were simply unable to access. For example, “Kevin”
explained that,
I don’t expect people who live in the South, or in England, or anywhere else for that matter, to
fully understand what this conﬂict was all about because they didn’t suffer the way we did in the
North. We was subjected to incredible violence and attacks in our community. I mean, it’s
almost a cliche to say that we [the PIRA] formed as a defence against these attacks. Time has
passed, and of course the question of partition and the extraordinary brutality of the British sol-
diers are all part of the bigger picture, and part of the Republican argument, but at the time I
was thinking more in terms of defending my community and I reckon anyone who was living
there understood this. For people in the South, maybe they sympathised or whatever, maybe
some of ‘em didn’t care, but maybe it’s just another story in the paper or on the news or what-
ever. I mean, unless you were there you couldn’t really know what it was like.50
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While emotions may be implicated in value judgments, this does not mean that the judg-
ment is necessarily accurate. However, it may imbue a sense of credibility to a value
judgment (as in it “feels” right, or a “gut feeling”), thereby strengthening it. “Coilm”
explained how he knew physical force Republicanism was the only way to deal with the situ-
ation in the North by saying,
… you come back on it and you defend against it without analysis, you don’t need the analysis
in a way. It becomes almost a physical thing - that defence against the organs of State. You
know the Republican analysis but you don’t need it to know what they are saying is correct
because you see it, you experience and feel it in your everyday life, you know?51
The Republican analysis, as “Coilm” puts it, is correct because it feels credible. It is so obvi-
ous and so natural that it is not even necessary to analyze it. In other words, a particular ideol-
ogy will not resonate unless it feels right.52 At this point in “Coilm”’s life, examples of British
values of freedom and democracy would be unlikely to change the visceral sense that the exist-
ing system was not credible, and therefore would be unlikely to alter his sense that the PIRA
provided the credible ideology that explained both the political circumstances of his commu-
nity and, consequently, the action required to change it. “Eamon” described knowing,
“instantly that Republicanism was the truth because it hits you like a brick when you come
across something that explains everything you see around you and all your experiences.”53
Indeed, the idea that strong belief involves some sort of visceral response to the message is not
unusual. We talk about “seeing the light,” “feeling the truth,” and “gut instinct” in a way that
connects somatic emotional responses to the idea of truth or credibility.
Feeling Emotions
As mentioned above, the visceral component of emotion is widely recognized. When an
emotion is experienced physically we can be said to be feeling the emotion. Most people
have experienced the blushing and rise in temperature associated with embarrassment or the
pounding of the heart which accompanies fear. While the cognitive elements of emotion
reﬂect learnt values and social expectations arising from cultivating aspects of social life such
as culture and religion, the biological element are a reminder that emotions like sadness, joy,
anger or shame are experienced by all people, regardless of the constructions that otherwise
deﬁne their social and cultural environments.54 The following response from a member on
why he joined the PIRA would be recognizable to many as an experience that has led to a
profound life change, “I don’t know, I just felt like I couldn’t stand it for one more day, you
know, like a pressure was building up and if I didn’t do something I would explode.”55
“Ruari” spoke of still being able to feel the pain and fury at hearing his mother
referred to as an “Irish fucking bitch” and having her shawl taken from her while try-
ing to cover up during a house raid in which she was only wearing a nightdress. “Even
now, every time I say that the hairs go up on the back of my neck because I remem-
ber,” he explains.56 The physical experience of emotion that brings it into consciousness
plays a role in making evaluations of what is right or wrong, fair or unfair, and credible
or not. In other words, our emotions “tell us things” that form the basis of our beliefs;
they are a channel through which it is possible to know the social world.57 Just as the
evocation to “follow your heart” draws a connection between the emotions and some
kind of inexplicable truth that goes beyond reason, emotions are intuitively used as evi-
dence that transcends the need for explanation.
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Emotions can be Misleading
Participants in the interviews were aware their emotions had, at times, misled them. The
most obvious examples of misleading emotions are those which are connected to phobias,
panic, and affective disorders.58 However, this is not the sort of deception that is central to
an examination of the emotional processes of violent political extremists, who historically
appear to show no greater propensities for such disorders than the general population.59 Of
more importance here is that even those without any form of affective disorder are vulnera-
ble to the sometimes misleading nature of emotion. The emotion experienced in a particular
situation might be in direct conﬂict with other cognitions.60 This PIRA member demon-
strated this when he said,
When my Ma confronted me about it [whether he had joined the PIRA] I was angry with
her, really yelling, you know, like, “what’s it to do with you” and stuff, but when I calmed
down I realised that the reason I responded like that was because I was feeling pretty
guilty about what I might be going to put her through. I mean, you are told in no uncer-
tain terms that if you join you’ll end up dead or in jail. Either way, that was going to
cause her some pain.61
The initial outburst of anger, on further reﬂection, seemed in conﬂict with this member’s
deeper sense of guilt and concern over what the consequences of his membership may be for
his mother. However, the misleading nature of emotion is not something limited to more
spontaneous emotional responses. It is possible to experience misleading emotions, even
with a high degree of cognition. For example, if we are taught to perceive something as dan-
gerous that is not so, for example a harmless spider, our fear at being confronted with that
spider would be misplaced, even though our cognitive processes are accurate.62 Take for
example this reﬂection from a PIRA member,
Looking back now I realise that I didn’t hate him [the man he killed] but I did hate what
he symbolised, you know, the uniform, the guns, the tanks, the barbed wire, I hated all
that because it was a symbol of the absolute oppression of the British. At the time I just
despised everyone who wore that uniform because I associated it with the suffering in my
community and with the oppression of the Irish people. Since then I’ve got to know about
him as a man, with a wife, and two wee little ones. He was a British soldier, but he was
just over here doing a job, you know, for all I know he didn’t want to be over here at all.
I walk by the ﬂat where he was killed once every few weeks and I say a prayer for his
family you know. I’m not proud [of what I did].63
It is likely that everyone experiences inaccurate or deceptive emotions at times simply
because emotions respond to judgments and beliefs about external conditions that are prone
to being imperfect. That is to say, the beliefs and judgments that become the foundation on
which some emotions are formed may at times be erroneous and therefore the emotion may
be misplaced, unreasonable, or deceptive. This is not the same as suggesting that emotions
are irrational.
Emotion as Social Phenomena
So far the understanding of emotion presented here has concentrated largely on the personal
experience while emphasising how this is connected to the wider social environment. How-
ever, emotions also operate within broader contexts. At a personal and interpersonal level
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people respond with a complex array of emotions to various events, people, objects, and
experiences. Yet as individuals we all belong to a variety of identity groups based on factors
as diverse as gender, religion, ethnicity, sexuality, or social status, to particular political afﬁli-
ations, professions, education alumni, sporting teams, families, or any other group with
which we may identify. In the following excerpt, the idea of group solidarity is expressed in
emotional terms as “afﬁnity.”
Well when internment came in it was pretty well a law that applied to Catholics. I mean, ofﬁ-
cially it could be applied to anyone but in reality it was applied to us Catholics and it was so
obvious. I mean, when the law came in, out of over 300 people interned only 2 of ‘em was Prot-
estants. I mean, of course you feel an afﬁnity with them because you know it could be you and
of course soon enough it was me and I was interned probably because I was a Catholic lad, so
there you go. I hadn’t even done anything at that stage.64
It was common for the interview participants to talk about their emotions as deeply con-
nected to their identity in ways that reinforced the concept of the Other as a deeply emotional
construct.65 Emotions experienced collectively or reﬂected in the emotions of others encour-
aged people to gravitate toward each other, developing bonds and feelings of closeness and
understanding. It suggests a shared perspective, forming an integral aspect of group political
solidarity. In this sense, group solidarity is not only about positive emotions such as love and
loyalty, but also the process of sharing more painful emotions such as fear, anger, or hate.
One participant talked of how he felt like a “different species” when he observed the difference
in the reactions to Bobby Sands death between prisoners and guards on the H Blocks, how-
ever, he also noted that it drew him closer together with his imprisoned colleagues who felt
similarly outraged at what was intended as profound disrespect for their grief.66
Just as shared emotions can help strengthen the cohesiveness of a group, the failure to rec-
ognize your emotions in those of others can lead to more distance, dehumanization, and a
reduction of concern or obligation toward them, including the obligation not to harm. A
reciprocal relationship in which emotion and identity intertwine to meld and shape each
other can lead to a highly politicized reading of emotional experiences and “[b]eing unable
to recognise your own emotional reality in the eyes of others” can form “part of the social
mechanisms that lead to the dehumanisation of the Other.”67
The consolidation between shared emotional experiences and identity may validate the
emotional experience, with identity imbuing it with purpose and meaning. Anger may be re-
appropriated as a legitimate expression of rights,68 or individually experienced shame can be
reread as group humiliation when it becomes recognized or reconstituted as connected to a
group identity. As such, transforming a person’s understanding of their emotional experien-
ces from a personal one to a collective one connected to a politicized identity is one of the
ways that extremist groups can build loyalty and commitment.69 Shame or humiliation can
be countered through the construction of pride and honor, fear can be circumvented by pro-
moting positive emotions such as joy or hope, and abrogation of societal laws and norms
can be encouraged by the adoption of new forms of loyalty.70
As well as talking about the emotions at a group level, some members discussed emotions
in a more diffuse and disembodied way as characterizing the environment. One participant
explained that,
[…] the atmosphere, it felt thick and heavy and oppressive. It’s hard to explain, but the North
just felt different, it’s like you are entering into a place that is deﬁned by all these negative
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experiences, of sadness, and injustice, of hate and suspicion. And that feeling hangs over you
like a cloud, weighing on you.71
By discussing emotions as ways that exist beyond themselves, the participants dem-
onstrate how some of the characteristics of emotion that have been discussed at an
individual level may coordinate or generalize out to the broader category of groups, as
well as to society more generally. Emotions are experienced within wider emotional
environments that are expressive of economic, social, political and institutional forces.72
This suggests that understanding how emotion is implicated in violent political extrem-
ism needs to take account of the way in which emotion operates at a variety of levels
in society, all contributing to how an individual experiences, understands, and responds
to their own particular circumstances. In other words, different social relations and
norms may inﬂuence or generate different kinds of emotion, depending on one’s posi-
tion in society and with whom one is interacting. Retaining this level of analysis seems
particularly suited to a study of the emotional aspect of violent extremist behavior
because it prioritizes the role of an individual’s experiences and perception of their
wider social milieu when considering how individual emotions might become activated
and sustained within particular group and societal emotional relationships.
Emotions Mobilize Action
Finally, the sixth theme related to emotion that emerged from the interviews is the associa-
tion between emotion and action. It is widely recognized that emotion helps to mobilize
action, as people act and react to emotional experiences. The sort of action associated with
emotion is often assumed to be rash, spontaneous, and pathological. However, individuals
tend to look for places to participate politically when they are moved to do so by deeply felt
emotional experiences. This participant identiﬁed the need to direct his emotions in a more
useful way as part of the motivation for joining the PIRA,
When I think back to when I decided to become an active Republican what I’d seen was oppres-
sion and injustice, and I thought, that’s exactly what I needed to do, I need to sign up to this
organisation who see themselves as people who were physically opposed to this by violent
means. It’s like, well, you can’t just sit around feeling angry, I mean jeez, you’d go mad. You
have to actually get out and do something, and whether that is rioting or whether that is throw-
ing some stones, or even joining the “RA” [IRA]. It feels better to be doing something than
nothing.73
Emotion guides our attention toward activities that necessitate some kind of action, mak-
ing us want to respond.74 In Aristotle’s understanding, anger arises from the knowledge that
we, or someone we care for, has been slighted, and leads to the desire for “returning pain” or
revenge.75 This desire for “returning pain” is evident in this PIRA member’s recollection of
how he felt towards the British Army’s presence in the North of Ireland,
[A]nd so I says, that’s the place for me [the PIRA], that’s what I want to do, I want to hurt, and I
want to get them down on to that boat, march them down to the docks and then get ‘em on that
boat and make ‘em go.76
The word desire is important when considering the relationship between emotion and
action because it does not suggest that the emotion–action sequence is behaviorally
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compelling as much as it suggests it is behaviorally inclining. The actions stimulated by emo-
tion are intended to alter the relationship between the person experiencing the emotion and
their current social environment.77 This is particularly important with regard to the study of
emotion in nonstate violent political behavior because it helps to direct attention away from
rigid preconceptions surrounding personal psychopathology in which people are viewed as
psychologically compelled to perpetrate acts of violence and instead focuses on how emotion
may make a person more inclined to pursue a violent agenda.
The idea that they were the ones acting morally was deeply embedded in the way the men
talked of their active involvement in the PIRA, including their use of violence. “Tadhg”
recalls that he “felt proud to be doing the right thing,”78 “Ruari” that he, “always felt we had
the moral high ground,”79 “Sean” that it was, “regrettable that we had to resort to violence,
but not immoral,”80 and “Liam” that, “I have no trouble sleeping at night. I did what I had
to do and I believe to this day that it was moral.”81 The violent actions of PIRA members
are, in part, an outcome of how they interpreted and understood their particular social and
political context, as well as their strong emotional responses to it. Their own particular per-
spective has been deﬁned by a strong moral imperative to defend and protect Catholic
enclaves that were viewed as under siege and threatened by a long history of British occupa-
tion deﬁned by social discrimination and political inequities. In part due to the experience of
emotions that were incompatible with the status quo, the members of PIRA had developed
an alternative moral stance toward society that released them from a sense of having to obey
the conventional rules and laws relating to the use of violence. Nevertheless, it was also
apparent that emotions were implicated on a continuum of instrumental to expressive action
as members sought to suppress or evoke particular emotions needed to commit acts of vio-
lence. “Keiran” acknowledged that,
[…] it would be a lie to stay you didn’t get a buzz when you were effective, but, well, you can’t
say that because it seems like, well it might seem like you are a fucking lunatic, a mad killer or
something, but it isn’t just, it isn’t the act, it’s what it means, if that makes sense. It isn’t the act
of being involved in a killing but that you have been effective on your mission, like any soldier,
you know, you get a buzz out of being effective in your strategy and part of being effective is
sometimes in killing a target […] there was always this sense of, you know, “well done” and a
great sense of camaraderie with all the people who were involved, ‘cos it means, if one person
fucked up everybody was fucked up. But, yeah, there was a great sense that we were doing some-
thing quite, even at the time, momentous, and I don’t say that lightly. People were doing things
which changed, can I say which changed history. […] There was deﬁnitely a sense of achieve-
ment in the operation as opposed to outcome, of performing your role and others performing
theirs. It was a good feeling.82
For all the men, the violence had a meaning that went beyond the act itself. Active partici-
pation within the PIRA provided a sense of fulﬁlment and self-realization that comes from
working toward something meaningful. Among volunteers there was a deﬁant stance in
which the perceived victimhood of their community could not be experienced passively. The
emotions that supported and responded to a sense of oppression and injustice provided a
platform for violent activity and were evident in the sense of liberation or catharsis that at
times accompanied the violent act, but also in the development of moral frameworks that
justiﬁed their violence. The interviews reveal that the relationship between emotions and
political violence was not as simple as promoting hate, experiencing humiliation, or sup-
pressing guilt or empathy, but required negotiating through complex emotional landscapes
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in which clusters of often contradictory emotions need to be simultaneously controlled,
managed, or heightened in order both to arouse the energy needed to act and the commit-
ment for the action to be violent.
Emotions Matter
Emotions are a part of human life, and therefore they matter. It is difﬁcult to conceive of any
social interaction in which some level of emotion is not a component. It is near impossible
to imagine this in the case of conﬂict, including violent political extremism. Violent political
action is ultimately a strategy but the goals of that strategy cannot always be understood in
terms of a list of political, economic, cultural, or social demands. These demands grow out
of desires that have more obvious emotional components. The desire for justice, equality,
security, autonomy, and meaning underpins many other demands, even if the form they
take is irreconcilable with our own particular understandings of these concepts. Further-
more, thrill, adventure, glory, solidarity, and brutality are all concepts unrecognizable with-
out emotion.
By conducting interviews that focused on exploring emotion with men from the PIRA it
emerged that their sense of being “second-class citizens” in their own country made it almost
impossible for them to experience their emotions in the same way as broader society. This
was particularly inﬂuential because these were not one-off negative emotional experiences
but habitual ones that were understood to be closely related to their identity. Even before the
development of a cognizant politicized identity they experienced politicized emotions that
acted as a kind of nascent warning that something was wrong with their social world. This
different way of experiencing their emotions was interpreted as prima facie evidence that
their social and political circumstances were unjust and, as such, they melded with thoughts
and cognitions to form an integral part of their epistemological stance.
Engaging with physical force republicanism was appealing to some extent because it
helped to make sense of their emotions in a way that the dominant ideology failed to do.
They expressed this in terms of “gut feelings”; it “felt right,” “resonated,” or was “credible”
to them. Furthermore, the repetition and reinterpretation of their emotions through this
ideological lens subsequently strengthened and brought further conviction to their beliefs.
For the participants in the interviews, the PIRA political ideology told them not only that it
was appropriate to feel angry, despairing, fearful, outraged, or any other way that they felt,
but that it was expected as long as the status quo prevailed. Furthermore, these emotions
were evidence of moral righteousness, of a deeper or more sophisticated understanding of
their situation, and therefore of an obligation to act. If they did not automatically feel the
way they “should” about the use of violence, they learned to do so by engaging in rituals,
training, or forms of self-discipline that managed their emotions in ways that enabled them
to do so.
Physical force republicanism also encouraged them to imagine a future that was better
than the present. As such, it gave a sense of purpose and hope when things around seemed
despairing. The moral framework that legitimized violence as a tactic emerged when their
emotions helped cultivate particular perceptions and rules surrounding what was right or
wrong, honorable or shameful, to do in particular circumstances. Emotions that contribute
to moral frameworks, such as anger, shame, guilt, fear, love, or compassion, paradoxically
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became the basis of what is often understood (outside of the group) as morally objectionable
behavior, such as the use of violence to achieve political ends.
Commitment to a violent extremist group is more than just a decision based on careful
analysis of objective fact. Emotions are present at every stage of the process of becoming a
violent extremist and also of leaving violent extremism behind. When talking with those
that have committed violent acts of political extremism it was clear that their emotions play
an integral role in inﬂuencing how they made sense of the world, who they saw as credible
sources of information, why the ideology resonated, and why a particular type of action (vio-
lence) was judged to be morally justiﬁable. This would suggest that, at the very least, it is
important to consider emotions systematically alongside other factors that are examined as
integral to acting on a violent political agenda.83
While it is important not to over-generalize claims to the extent of ignoring nuances
and differences between varieties of violent extremist groups, Hegghammer’s explora-
tions of the prominence and role of jihadi culture has led him to suggest that emo-
tional processes are clearly important when someone decides to join an underground
jihadist group. He expresses apprehension that jihadi studies in particular, but terror-
ism studies more broadly, may be “repeating itself” by focusing on operational factors
and doctrinal aspects of ideology at the expense of broader cultural and emotional fac-
tors.84 Equally, understanding the way that emotions are experienced, shaped, and per-
formed online would seem to be a valuable area of inquiry when attempting to
understand the inﬂuence of the so-called Islamic State’s social media strategy, including
why their message may resonate with some people. Developing the interdisciplinary
study of emotion within terrorism studies helps provide another tool in the analytical
toolbox available to researchers to help understand why people not only join, but
choose to stay, or indeed leave, violent extremist groups.
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